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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between a firm's investment decision and its financial situation.
We present a model of investment, where the cost of external finance is increasing in the debt ratio.
The model is estimated using a panel of Norwegian manufacturing establishments for the period 1977-
1990. The empirical analysis finds a positive relationship between a firm's debt ratio and its marginal
return to capital. This indicates that firms with high debt ratios have higher costs of finance than other
firms. Including convex adjustment costs in the model did not change this result, as the size of the
adjustment costs was found to be very small.
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1 Introduction
Will a market economy always supply funds for profitable investment projects?
The answer to this question is important for policy makers seeking economic
efficiency at the micro level, and for our understanding of the business cycle at
the macro level. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the presence and
the economic importance of credit market imperfections within a structural
model of firm investment.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented conditions under which a firm's
investment decision is independent of its financial situation. Newer theory has
shown that there are several reasons to expect a wedge between the cost of
outside and inside finance. First, there are transaction costs associated with
debt and outside equity. Second, debt is costly if there are dead weight costs
associated with bankruptcy. These costs can be both direct, for example in the
form of fees to lawyers, or indirect in the form of lost reputation for the firm
or the manager. Jensen and Meckling (1976) have pointed out that debt has
an agency cost; limited liability will give the equity owners and the managers
incentives to take on too risky projects because they will get the benefits of the
projects without paying the costs. Finally, if there is a problem of asymmetric
information between insiders and outsiders, the cost of outside finance might
include a lemons premium, as suggested by Meyers and Majluf (1984).
A possible implication of financial constraints is that investment for con-
strained firms should be characterized with excess sensitivity to cash flow.
However, a positive relationship between cash flow and investment has no
clear interpretation. This is because cash flow not only measures liquidity, but
also is a good proxy for the marginal product of capital, both in current and
future periods.
To analyze our problem we need a structural model of investment, and
a specification of how a financial constraint enters this model. We model
the investment decision by assuming that there are convex adjustment costs
associated with investment, and that firms have rational expectations. Future
investment decisions can then give us information about current expectations,
and the optimal investment path can be described in a dynamic, stochastic
model. If capital is freely adjustable, the optimal capital stock can be described
in a user price model — a special case of the model above.
We will not try to distinguish between the different theories of capital
market imperfections 2 , but simply model the interest rate on debt as increasing
2 See Oliner and Rudebush (1992) for an empirical investigation of the source of the
finance hierarchy.
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in the debt to assets ratio. We then test the dependence of investment on
financial factors by estimating over different sub samples where we expect
different degrees of credit market imperfections. A priori we expect that credit
constraints might vary over time, with firm size, with a firm's dividend and
equity policy and with a firm's access to foreign capital. In this paper we will
focus on differences over time and across different firm sizes.
The implications of credit constraints in our investment model are empir-
ically testable. A credit constrained firm will act as if it faced a higher user
price on capital than an unconstrained firm. An additional implication can
be derived if adjustment costs are convex and of substantial economic impor-
tance. A credit constraint will then affect a firm's smoothing of investments
over time, while adjusting to the optimal level of capital stock.
The empirical model is estimated using a panel of Norwegian manufacturing
firms for the period 1977-1990. Over these years the financial sector went
through large changes. A significant deregulation of the credit market took
place in 1984, and in the late 1980s several large banks experienced financial
distress. This raises two important questions: First, did the credit market
deregulation lead to a structural change in the relationship between investment
and finance? And second, how did the bank crisis affect the allocation of funds
among firms competing for a limited pool of external finance?
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some related
papers. Section 3 presents a model of investment where the firm's cost of
outside finance is increasing in its debt ratio. The econometric method is
discussed in section 4. Section 5 describes the data and how the sample and the
variables are constructed. In section 6 we present the results of our econometric
analysis. The final section summarizes and concludes.
2 Other Studies of Investment and Finance
Two approaches appear in the literature of investment with adjustment costs:
The Euler equation approach and the Tobin's q approach. The approaches
differ by how the expected net present value of the marginal return to capital
is measured. The Tobin's q approach uses the stock market valuation of the
firm to measure future returns to capital, while the Euler equation approach
equates these to the marginal cost of capital in the next period. Since share
prices only were available for a small number of firms in our sample, and it is
firms that are not publicly traded that are most likely to face capital market
imperfections, this paper uses the Euler equation approach. Both approaches
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have been used to analyze the relationship between finance and investment.
A brief overview of the literature with special emphasis on the Euler equation
approach is given below.
2.1 The Tobin's q approach
This literature studies a regression of investment on cash flow, output, Tobin's
q and other variables. A large coefficient for cash flow is taken as an indication
of financial constraints. Separate parameters are estimated for various classes
of firms where one expects different degrees of credit rationing.
Fazzari et al. (1988) use U.S. manufacturing data and estimate separate q
models for firms that pay high and low dividends. They find that cash flow
has the highest influence on investment for low dividend firms. This seems
consistent with financial constraints, since low dividend firms are less likely to
have internal funds available to finance investment projects.
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) use U.K. manufacturing data and classify
firms by size, age and characteristics of their industry. In most cases cash flow
is found to have the highest impact on investment when information problems
are present.
In a similar fashion Hoshi et al. (1991) examine two groups of Japanese
firms. They find that investment is least sensitive to cash flow for firms that
are members of industrial groups with close relationships to banks.
Though the method seems intuitive and "excess sensitivity" of investment
to cash flow has been documented in numerous papers, there are several prob-
lems with the q approach. A serious deficiency of the model is that cash flow
is included in an ad hoc manner. Chirinko (1993) discusses how capital con-
straints may even be captured by q. In addition to this, the empirical results
generally find that q does not explain investment well and that the estimated
adjustment cost parameter is unreasonably large. An alternative explanation
for the "excess sensitivity" result is that the firms that are thought to be
constrained face larger uncertainty than more established firms, and therefore
respond more strongly to information about the future embodied in current
cash flow.
2.2 The Euler equation approach
This approach was pioneered by Zeldes (1989) who estimated Euler equations
for consumers with different levels of wealth. A similar method is used in the
investment literature which examines an Euler equation of investment, derived
5
under the assumption of an exogenous constraint on the firm's level of debt.
Unless the value of an unobserved multiplier is included, the Euler equation
will be misspecified. The model without a constraint is then estimated for sub
samples where different degrees of credit constraints are expected, and the ex-
istence of credit constraints is examined with a specification test. This method
is unsatisfactory because there are several reasons a specification test can re-
ject the model, and even if the model is rejected because of credit constraints
the method does not say much about their economic importance. This line of
analysis has been extended by modeling the multiplier on the credit constraint
as a function of observables, but this is done in an ad hoc manner.
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) estimate Euler equations for investment us-
ing aggregate data for U.S. agriculture for the period 1914-1987. A GMM
estimator allows a test of the overidentifying restrictions of the model. The
overidentifying restrictions are rejected unless a measure of net worth is in-
cluded in the instrument set. Estimating the model over only the years in
which net worth was increasing, helps the model pass the specification test.
They also parameterize the multiplier for the credit constraint as a function of
net worth. This term is found significant when included in the Euler equation.
Similarly, but using firm level panel data, Whited (1992) models the degree
of credit rationing as a function of the debt to assets ratio and the interest
coverage ratio. Separate Euler equations for firms grouped by these variables
are estimated. Assuming that a firm can reduce the difference in information
between insiders and outsiders by having its debt rated, she also splits the
sample into firms with and without bond ratings. The results show that the
proxies for credit rationing are significant. Using the test of overidentifying
restrictions, the model is accepted for firms with low debt to assets ratios
and interest coverage ratios and rejected for firms with high debt to assets
ratios and interest coverage ratios. The difference between the firms with and
without bond ratings is less apparent.
This approach is continued in Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1993) where
the multiplier for the credit constraint is modeled as a function of cash flow
and the change in the spread between the risky and the safe interest rates.
The latter is meant to capture the tightness of borrowing constraints at the
macro level. When only cash flow is included the overidentifying restrictions
are rejected and the effect on the discount rate is found to be small, but
significant. When both measures are included the overidentifying restrictions
are no longer rejected and the effect on the discount rate is larger. The authors
point out that one reason for this result can be that their regressions do not
include time dummies.
A weakness of the models above is that the credit constraint is taken as
exogenous in the modeling of optimal investment. A firm's investment or
debt policy today will affect its probability of being constrained tomorrow.
Bond and Meghir (1992) take this into account and include an interest rate
premium on debt instead of an absolute constraint on the debt level. The model
is estimated for a panel of U.K. manufacturing companies. Their empirical
model does not use the Euler equation for debt and is therefore only specified
correctly for firms that are not credit constrained. They find that measures
of cash flow can explain investment and that this effect is strongest for firms
that pay low dividends or firms that issue new equity.
Jaramillo, Sciantarelli and Weiss (1993) estimate Euler equations for a
panel of Ecuadorian firms. Their model includes both an increased cost of
borrowing and an exogenous ceiling for the debt to capital ratio, but assumes
that the firm pays positive dividends. The results indicate that small and
young firms are credit constrained, while large and old firms are not. The
paper also finds that financial deregulation in Ecuador in the 1980s did not
relax the constraint for small firms.
The Euler equation approach has successfully overcome most of the criti-
cism of the models within the q approach. Little effort, however, has been spent
specifying alternative adjustment cost technologies, and one should therefore
be careful interpreting the results.
3 The Model
In this section we present the standard adjustment-cost model for investment.
As in Bond and Meghir (1992) we model financial constraints by assuming that
the firm's cost of funds is increasing in its debt to assets ratio. This interest
rate premium is meant to capture three costs of external finance: from dead
weight loss associated with bankruptcy, from the agency cost of debt and from
a lemons premium. Our assumption is that all these costs, or the probabilities
of incurring them, increase as a firm's level of debt increases relative to the
value of its collateral.
The advantages of modeling financial constraints in the way described
above are that we endogenize the firm's cost of external finance and that
this cost has an easy interpretation. The disadvantage is that with our choice
of functional forms, we exclude the possibility that firms are constrained in a
non-smooth way. Our empirical model differs from that of Bond and Meghir
7
(1992) in that it is derived from the first order conditions for both investment
and debt.
3.1 Theoretical Assumptions
We assume that the manager of the firm behaves in the interest of the current
owners and maximizes the present value of their dividends , Dt+i
00
1ft = Et
 E ,at,; (Dt+i)
.J=0
Here f3t+i = 
	 ) is the discount factor between period t and t i.
The dividends in period t are given by:
Dt
 = II(Kt , Lt , It) + Bt - (1 + i (Bt_ i , qt_iKt-i))Bt-i 	(2)
where Ht is the net debt of the firm at time t, Kt the capital stock and i the
interest rate. Profits are given by:
II(Kt , Lt , It) = Pt (Y) [F(Kt , L t) - G(Kt , It)] — wt _L t — qtit 	(3)
where Y(.) = F(.) — GO is output net of adjustment costs, L t variable factors
and h investment with prices P(Y),
 Wt and qt respectively.
Two remarks about the model are necessary at this point. First, we assume
that tax incentives and transaction costs make debt a cheaper form of finance
than new equity, and do not include new share issues in our model. An al-
ternative interpretation could be that the cost of new equity also is increasing
in the debt ratio. Second, the fact that firms pay different interest rates is
of course not an indication of imperfect credit markets. Stiglitz (1969) shows
that the Modigliani-Miller theorem is also valid for the case with a given prob-
ability of bankruptcy. In this case the differences in the interest rates on debt
reflect differences in the probability of bankruptcy. The interest rate premium
on debt in our model is therefore meant to capture costs in addition to those
reflecting a given probability of bankruptcy.
The firm maximizes 14 subject to:
Kt
 = (1 -
	 +
	 (4)
Dt >
	
(5)
(4) is the capital accumulation constraint. (5) restricts dividends to be positive
and prevents a constrained firm from borrowing at the discount rate. Letting
(1)
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At
 denote the multiplier for the constraint in (5), the value function for the
maximization problem is:
(6)
max 14(Kt-1, A-0
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 I , Lt , It) + Bt — (1 + i(•)) 13t-1]
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First order conditions for L,I and B together with envelope results are given
in appendix A. Combining these we get the Euler equations for capital, (7),
and debt, (8):
(7)
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Here A t+i
 1+1+A tAt i is the shadow value of funds in the next period relative to
the present period.
Ignoring capital constraints we see that (7) equates the marginal cost of
investing to the expected marginal revenue, where marginal revenues from
period t 1 onwards are equated to marginal cost in period t -1- 1. The equation
can be solved forward to see that the marginal cost of investing should be equal
to the expected discounted sum of marginal revenues. (8) gives the relationship
between the firm's discount rate and the rate at which it borrows. We see
that in the absence of financial constraints these rates must be equal if the
maximization problem has an interior solution for debt.
Including a constraint on positive dividends we see that all revenues and
costs are valued at the appropriate shadow value of funds. An interest rate
premium on debt has two effects on a firm's Euler equations. First, investment
implies increased collateral which may lower the cost of external finance in the
future. This is the first term on the right hand side of (7). Second, from (8)
we see that firms with high debt ratios behave as if they have a lower discount
factor than firms with low debt ratios. Financially constrained firms value
income today higher than income tomorrow.
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3.2 Empirical Specification
In order to derive an empirical model we need to make further assumptions
about expectations, demand, technology and the relationship between the debt
ratio and the interest rate. We can remove the expectation operator in both
the Euler equations by adding an expectation error. Under the assumption of
rational expectations, this error is orthogonal to information available at time t.
We assume a constant markup, tt = (1 --5,1 ) -1 , where ED is the price elasticity
of demand. We also assume constant elasticity of scale, v =
Adjustment costs that are convex in h and decreasing in Kt , are specified as
in Summers (1981):
bG(It , Kt)
These assumptions give:
(797all) __=„7,1 b G) t _ gt
(ari 	 (pY) (wL) lptb (
 I\
t
	us:it
The cost of outside finance is modeled as an interest rate premium, where the
interest rate is linear in the debt to assets ratio:
it
Bt-i
= + a
qt-iKt-i
(12)
The Euler equation for debt is then:
1	 1	 b
	= 	 At+1 et+1
	
(13)1 d- i°+1 2a(fi-j t
	1 -I- rt+i
In appendix B we show how (10), (11) and (13) together with (7) and (8) after
some simplifications gives
(14)
=
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This is the estimated model. Here the r's are all positive parameters that
are calculated from the depreciation rate, the interest rate and prices of output
and capital. The "deep" parameters of the model are it, v, a and b.
For the model without adjustment costs and financial constraints (a =
and b = 0) our equation sets the return to capital equal to the user price
which is captured by the time dummy, dt . This allows the user price to vary
across different time periods, as the interest rate and the inflation rate changes.
When we include the cost of debt finance, but not adjustment costs, we see
that firms with a high debt ratio act as if they face a higher user price. This
is because these firms must cover higher financing expenses.
If convex adjustment costs are included, the marginal cost of investing will
be increasing in the size of the investment. The higher the level of current
investment, the higher is the required return to capital. Because large changes
in the investment level are costly when adjustment costs are convex, current
period's investment should be positively correlated with next period's invest-
ment. Next period's investment therefore enters with the opposite sign. The
dynamic effects of financial constraints are easier to analyze if we solve the
model with respect to current period's investment. We see that a constrained
firm will invest less today than an unconstrained firm — given the same level
of marginal product of capital today and expected investment tomorrow. The
two final terms, fi
 and ei ,t4. 1 are discussed in the next section.
4 Econometric Method
Since
 €,t+1 contains an expectation error it will not be orthogonal to infor-
mation available after the investment decision was made. We use a GMM
estimator where the right hand side variables are instrumented with predeter-
mined variables. The theoretical model indicates that variables dated t and
earlier are valid instruments, but this is due to our assumption that investment
is productive immediately. If investment first is productive in the next period,
or shocks to the production function are realized after the investment decision
is made, variables dated t — 1 and earlier are valid instruments. An additional
reason for instrumenting is that productivity shocks may cause variable costs
to be correlated with the error term, see Mundlak and Hoch (1965). The Sar-
gan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is used to choose the preferred
instrument set.
The key identifying assumptions is that the error term, ei ,t+1 is uncorrelated
with the instruments. This will not be the case if a substantial part of the
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error is due to macroeconomic shocks. We include time dummies to remove
this correlation. The time dummies also measure the user price of capital. The
firm effect,
 f , is included to capture variation in the user price across firms, and
to capture omitted inputs as, for example, R&D capital. Since the traditional
method of removing a fixed effect by subtracting firm means introduces a bias
in short panels when instruments are not strictly exogenous, the variables are
transformed to deviations from means of future values (orthogonal deviations).
See Arrelano and Bond (1991) and Keane and Runkle (1992). Because most
of the variation in debt ratios is across firms, we also report regressions with
variables in levels and industry dummies. All regressions are performed using
the program DPD for GAUSS, documented in Arrelano and Bond (1988).
5 Data
5.1 Data sources
Our data set is an unbalanced panel of Norwegian firms in the manufacturing
sector (ISIC 31-38) for the period 1977-1990. The source for financial variables
is the Statistics of Accounts3 , which gives income statement and balance sheet
information for all firms in the manufacturing sector with more than 50 em-
ployees. A firm (enterprise) is defined as the "smallest legal unit comprising
all economic activities engaged in by one and the same owner." Firms are
classified into ISIC industry subgroups by their main activity.
These data are merged with the Manufacturing Statistics'', which include
information about ownership, production, costs, investment and capital stock
at the plant/establishment level. The Manufacturing Statistics is a yearly
survey of all firms in the manufacturing industry. When aggregating from
the plant level to the firm level we included all plants with more than five
employees.
5.2 Variables
Our measure of investment is an aggregate of gross investment in machinery,
buildings and transport equipment, the latter of minor importance compared
to the first two. We also tried to include purchases and sales of plants in our
investment variable, but this did not change our conclusions below. For capital
stock we used the fire insurance values of buildings and machinery, and the
3See NOS (1990) and earlier for documentation and a list of variables.
4See Halvorsen et al. (1991) for documentation and a list of variables.
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book value of transport equipment. By using fire insurance values we avoided
constructing a capital stock measure from the perpetual inventory formula,
which needs several years of observations and may induce a time varying mea-
surement error. Our sales variable is corrected for taxes and subsidies. Variable
costs include inputs and wages. Constructing the net debt ratio we used book
value of long term debt, net of fixed assets not included in our measure of
capital stock. Further details are given in appendix C.
5.3 Data set construction
In selecting our final sample we deleted firms where more than 50% of the
equity is owned by central or local government. Except for a small number
of private firms and cooperatives, this left almost exclusively corporations in
the sample. Trying to isolate measurement errors in the capital stock and
firms for which the capital stock has a negligible role in production, we also
deleted observations if the yield to capital was outside a range of ± 0.6 from
the industry's yearly median. For similar reasons we deleted observations if
long term debt and working capital was more than 50% larger than the capital
stock. Finally, we kept only the observations where at least four consecutive
years were observed. This is the lowest number of consecutive observations
per firm needed to estimate the model with lagged values as instruments, fixed
effect and adjustment costs. Together this construction reduced the number
of observations by about 25%. Summary statistics for the sample and the
variables are provided in appendix D.
6
 Results
This section reports results for three alternative model specifications. Sepa-
rate parameters are estimated for three different time periods5 and for three
sizes of firme. The main objective of our empirical analysis is to estimate
the parameter a and to study its variation across firm sizes and time peri-
ods. Estimating separate parameters for different subsamples also gives us a
specification test for the modeling of demand and technology. Both OLS and
GMM estimates are reported. We focus on the results where variables are
transformed to orthogonal deviations, since the hypothesis of no fixed effect
was strongly rejected for all models estimated by OLS. All tables are found in
5 1977-83, 1984-87 and 1988-90.
6small firms (50-100 employees), medium firms (100-500 employees) and large firms (500+
employees).
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appendix D.
We start with the model without adjustment costs. Table 1 shows that
there is a significant positive relationship between the marginal return to cap-
ital and the debt ratio. This result holds both when the model is estimated in
levels and in deviations, and with and without instruments. Also notice the
estimates of E. If we assume constant returns to scale this indicates a small
but significant markup of prices over marginal costs of about 2-3%. This is
slightly lower than what is found on a larger sample in Klette (1993).
In table 2 we estimate separate parameters for different size firms. For the
estimates in deviations with lagged values of the right hand side variables as
instruments, we see that the estimate of a is larger for small firms compared
to medium and large size firms. This confirms the results from other studies
in the literature — small firms are more likely to be credit constrained than
larger firms.
Table 3 shows estimates for three different time periods — we see that
the estimates of a from table I seem to be stable over the first two periods.
This indicates that the credit market deregulation did not change the way
funds were allocated among firms. For the last period (1988-90) we find a
smaller and insignificant estimate. An explanation for this result can be that
the most constrained firms left our panel in this period, due to bankruptcy or
ownership changes. To test this explanation we estimated the model only for
firms that existed in 1990. This also gave significant estimates of a in the first
two periods, but not for 1988-90 (not reported). An alternative explanation is
that this period has too few observations to obtain precise estimates after the
fixed effect is removed.
Tables 4-6 give results for the model with adjustment costs. The estimate of
a does not seem to be sensitive to the inclusion of adjustment costs. The esti-
mate of the adjustment cost parameter, b, is generally found to be insignificant
or very small. In most cases even a "large" investment gives an adjustment
cost of less than 1% of the investment expenditure'. We also tried to estimate
the model using next period's investment as the dependent variable, but in
most cases this gave negative values for the estimated adjustment cost param-
eter. A similar result was found by Bond and Meghir (1992). One explanation
for this result is that the adjustment cost technology is misspecified. Another
explanation is that adjustment costs are very small or non convex. If the latter
is the case, a model with investment as the dependent variable has no clear
7For an investment expenditure equal to 30% of the value of the capital stock, an adjust-
ment cost parameter of 0.10 gives an adjustment cost of V-0.31 = 0.0151, that is 1.5% of
the value of the investment.
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interpretation. We are therefore left with the user cost interpretation of the
model.
So far we have only included long term assets and liabilities. Short term
assets can be thought of both as a factor of production and as a source of
finance. In the last specification we include working capital, short term assets
net of short term debt, AsTcBs . Fazzari and Petersen (1993) include the change
in working capital in a q-model of investment and find that working capital is
an input that competes with fixed investment for finance. Tables 7-9 report
results for this model. In table 7 we see that working capital enters with a
positive coefficient. This was to be expected if working capital is an input.
The estimates of a are somewhat reduced, but note that for the model in
deviations the Sargan test rejects the overidentifying restrictions of the model.
This indicates that we have an endogeneity problem for working capital.
A high level of working capital may signal that a firms financial situation
is good, and reduce its required return to capital. Working capital should
therefore enter the user price model with a lower coefficient for constrained.
firms than for unconstrained firms. In table 8 we see that the estimated coef-
ficients are lowest for small firms, though the difference is not significant. The
results from the last specification are somewhat inconclusive, but indicate that
a closer study of the role of working capital, including inventory behaviour, is
an interesting topic for future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper has . two conclusions. The main result of the paper is that there
exists a positive relationship between a firm's debt ratio its marginal return to
capital. The relationship is economically (and statistically) significant. A 10
percentage point increase in a firm's debt ratio increases the required return
on capital by 1/2 to 1 percentage point. The effect seems to be strongest for
small firms. It is also robust with respect to the deregulation of the credit
market in the mid-1980s, but somewhat surprisingly it seems to disappear in
the last years of our analysis.
The second result is that our estimates of adjustment costs are very small
compared to what has been found in the studies discussed in section 2 of this
paper. For most studies within the Euler equation approach, adjustment costs
amount to 10-20% of the average investment expenditure, which is still very
little compared to results for Tobin's q models. Further research within this
area should extend the adjustment costs model, both using different functional
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forms and considering non-convex adjustment costs and irreversibility.
Numerous studies, including this, find that small and young firms are most
prone to be financially constrained. This indicates that additional evidence
of financing constraints can be found by studying the smallest firms in the
Manufacturing Statistics. For these firms, however, balance sheet information
of the type used in this paper is unavailable, and thus a different approach is
needed.
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Appendix A: Envelope and first order condi-
tions
= 0 	(15)
avt+1 an 	 1 	 1.A t ) (-5-k ) + (1 -i- At ) tan \ — — Et Li rt+i aKt (16)
av„
	
aKt_i
=(1+At)(i 6)
 (all)
	
+(i s)Et [,	 anvt:1 1
	I 	 rt+i U lkrtaK	 (aKa _ 1 )
(17)
(1 + At) Et[ 	 avt+11Li -Frt+1 aBt
aBt_i
av 	 (1+ A,)(1+ it+ Bt_i aBa _ 1 ), 
Combining (16) with (17) for period t and t 1 gives (7). Combining (18)
with (19) for period t 1 gives (8).
Appendix B: The simplified Euler equation
To derive a model which is linear in the parameters we use a first order Taylor
approximation of (13):
1	 1 
	B	 1
	 At+1+ fbt+i
	
(20)
1 -1- i4 1 	(1 -I- 4+1 ) 22a (qK) t rf.'d
 1 -I- rt-Fi
Inserting (10), (11) and (20) into (7), and multiplying trough by -4; we get
8
8We have assumed that 4+1 is uncorrelated with variables in the Euler equation for
capital. As discussed in Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1993) this assumption is valid
under the null hypothesis of no capital market imperfections.
=0 	(18)
(19)
20
it (TILL)
(P Y )qK t 	-1;	 t
Act qt+i 2(1 — 8) 	B
qt (1+i 1 ) 24+  qK)
+
	
t
pa (1— S) (B 2
V 1 + 4+1
 K t
(21)
bpt+1 (1-6) (I)
v q R It V q
	i
 -I- 4)+1
l_c_tP. Pt+1  2(1 — b)  ( B ) ( I
v qt ( 1 44.0 2 qK )	 ) t+1
	qt+1  (1 — 6.) 	"2  (1 — e)  ( B ) 3 +)
	Zt+1	 V (1 + isi)+02 qK t
Since a is small we ignore the second term in line 5. Also notice the first
term in line 5 which is the user price of capital. For simplicity we write the
equation:
Liv+1 G)t}
ati {
7r2 (.1/4) Bt 7r3 G?):}-F—
+.12- { 7.4 	— 7r- G"): 7r6VI	 K t
"+" .C±-1—)
 {	
n
r7 (g)
	 + dt ei,t+4
t n
(22)
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Appendix C: Construction of variables
The source and construction of the variables used in the analysis is given
below. Variable numbers in the Statistics of Accounts and the Manufacturing
Statistics are referred to as [ j a and [ ] n respectively.
Investment (I): Gross investment in machinery [1141]„, transport equip-
ment [1151], and buildings [11611„.
Capital (K): Fire insurance value of machinery [8711„, and buildings
[8811, plus book value of transport equipment [43401 a . In addition to the
reported fire insurance value, two alternative measures of Kt were constructed
using the capital accumulation constraint. For observations where Kt was not
consistent with either of these measures it was replaced by an average of the
two alternatives.
Output (Y) Gross production [10411„, plus subsidies [2911„ minus taxes
[3011„.
Variable costs (L): Inputs [10611„ and wages [3811„.
Long term debt (B): Book value of long term debt [52001 a minus fixed
assets [42001 a plus book value of buildings, transport equipment and machinery
[43301 a trough [44101 a , plus 50% of conditional tax-free allocations [5300] a .
Negative values were replace by 0.
Short term debt (Bs): Book value of short term debt [50001 a .
Current assets (As): Book value of current assets [40001.-
The following variables were used in constructing the r's in the model, but
not in constructing the user price which was measured using time dummies.
Depreciation rates (8): 0.06 for machinery and 0.02 for buildings. From
Norwegian National Accounts.
Interest rate (i°): Interest rate on bearer bonds, from Bank og Kred-
ittstatistikk 15/93.
Price indexes (p q): Price indexes for gross output, buildings and ma-
chinery. From Norwegian National Accounts.
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Appendix D: Tables
Table 1: MODEL WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT COSTS
(Y
{71 (=L) 1 + a: tr2 (B) 73 (A) 2 )
K	 K\ A It
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
E. 1.028 (0.002) 1 1.024 (0.005) 1.030 (0.002) 1.024 (0.005)
all-1. 0.083 (0.008) 0.074 0.010 0.085 (0.009) 0.115 ( 1016)
Sargan2 42.2 [ 46 ] 53.1 [ 46 ]
W(d)3 32.2 [ 11 1 164.3 [ 12 ] 36.6 [ 11 ] 146.3 [ 12 ]
W(finclustry) 95.1 [ 10 ] 99.8 [ 10]
m1 4 22.8 [ 1282 ] 14.3 [ 1282 ] 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.3 [ 1282]
5
7122 17.5 E 1116 ] 8.3 [ 1116 ] 17.5 [ 1116 ] 8.2 [ 1116]
Instruments t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Observations 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
i Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2 Sargan is the Sarganglansen test of overidentifying restrictions which has a x2 distribution with [N]
degrees of freedom.
'WO is a Wald test of joint significance which has a x2 distribution with [N] degrees of freedom.
4 mi is a test of first order serial correlation and is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.
5 m2 is a test of second order serial correlation and is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.
23
Table 2: MODEL WITH ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY FIRM SIZE
JÅ B 2
fri LK 	+	 { 72 (-7-Ber) - ( ) 1 fi+	 + ei,t+1t 	 11. 	 t
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
dsmall 1.030 (0.002) 1.030 (0.004) 1.033 (0.002) 1.032 (0.004)
,. - dmedium 1.027 (0.003) 1.025 (0.005) 1.030 (0.002) 1.011 (0.004)
dlarge 1.022 (0 .005) 0.998 (0.007) 1.010 (0.003) 0.994 (0.004)
all'a,dsma n 0.071 (0.010) 0.068 (0.015) 0.066 (0.010) 0.150 (0.021)
a 8v dmedium 0.094 (0.011) 0.078 (0.014) 0.090 (0.011) 0.078 (0.021)
a 8y dlarge 0.105 (0.023) 0.066 (0.025) 0.148 (0.018) 0.058 (0.038)
Sargan 142.3 [ 138 1 141.0 [ 138 ]
W(d) 31.6 [ 11 ] 162.0 [ 12 ] 34.9 { 11 ] 137.0 [ 12 ]
W(findustry) 96.4 { 10 ] 98.9 [ 10 I
m1 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.2 { 1282 ] 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.4 [ 1282]
m2 17.4 [ 1116 ] 8.1 [ 1116 1 17.3 [ 1116 ] 8.3 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 3: MODEL WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY TIME PERIODS
(Y
/Iv 	(=L	
+ -
	(B7)	 On 2	 fi dt ei,t+i
t	 4 RP )\ A ' t
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
.d77_83 1.028 (0.003) 1.024 (0.006) 1.032 (0.002) 1.022 (0.005)
d84-87 1.029 (0.003) 1.024 (0.004) 1.031 (0.003) 1.016 (0.006)
d88_90 1.025 (0.005) 1.020 (0.005) 1.027 (0.004) 1.007 (0.009)
a i c/77_83 0.081 (0.011) 0.085 (0.013) 0.082 (0.012) 0.109 (0.017)
a Ed84_87 0.097 (0.013) 0.077 (0.013) 0.089 (0.016) 0.090 (0 .027)
a48_90 0.063 (0.018) 0.024 (0.016) 0.087 (0.021) 0.049 (0.054)
Sargan 41.4 [ 42 ] 41.6 [ 42 ]
W(d) 9.0 [ 11 ] 39.2 [ 12 ] 10.1 [ 11 ] 34.8 [ 12 1
W (findustry) 95.3 [ 10 ] 99.8 [ 10]
m1 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.3 [ 1282 ] 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.0 [ 1282]
rn2 17.5 [ 1116 ] 8.3 [ 1116 1 17.5 [ 1116 ] 8.3 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 4: MODEL WITH ADJUSTMENT COSTS
2
11	 L	 B	 B
{ 71 (T) i }	 { 71-2 (18,7) t
{ 71.4 (I) _ 71.5 (k) t _ 76 (I) 1 } _v_ab { 77 (TB) t	)t
V	 t	 t+ K 1
2
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
ihI, 1.023 (0.003) 1.020 (0.004) 1.024 (0.002) 1.022 (0.003)
a--'` 0.074 (0.010) 0.067 (0.012) 0.038 (0.017) 0.086 (0.019)
b-f- -0.001 ( 1025) -0.032 (0.019) 0.169 (0.094) 0.043 (0.035)
ab-L-- 0.168 (0.066) 0.152 (0.046) 0.572 (0.153) 0.188 (0.100)
Sargan 102.2 [ 88 ] 133.8 [ 88]
W(d) 33.3 [ 11 1 157.7 [ 12 ] 36.5 [ 11 ] 136.9 [ 12]
W(findustry) 54.8 [ 10 ] 61.0 [ 10]
m1 21.4 [ 1282 ] 12.3 [ 1282 ] 20.4 [ 1282 ] 12.3 [ 1282]
7122 16.6 E 1116 1 6.6 [ 1116 ] 15.3 [ 1116 ] 6.3 [ 1116]
Instruments t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Observations 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 5: MODEL WITH ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY FIRM SIZE
B	 B 2
) =
	
{71 G) t} fliv {7r 2 ( 7i7) 7r 3 ( K
b	 ( j\ 2 	_ab ir7 (k_B) (1.17)
- - 7r6 (7";)
	 v	 I tk	 t+
-F- it4t-;
) t	 Kjt
	 t-f-i + f + dt + ei,t+i
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
.,..,dsina ti 1.026 (0.002) 1.021 (0.004) 1.028 ( 1002) 1.027 (0.003)
,,- Cirnedium 1.025 (0.003) 1.026 (0.005) 1.028 (0.002) 1.022 (0.006)
dlarge 1.009 (0.003) 1.000 (0.005) 1.004 (0.002) 1.005 (0.004)
af,- dsmait 0.069 (0.010) 0.079 (0.016) 0.062 (0.014) 0.166 (0.024)
a 1:--` din edium 0.069 (0.016) 0.051 (0.018) 0.079 (0.019) 0.046 (0.021)
afv;citarge 0.071 (0.020) 0.039 (0.029) 0.066 (0.017) 0.067 (0.028)
tidsmati -0.014 (0.027) -0.050 (0.025) 0.080 (0.094) 0.022 (0.042)
bl-dinedium 0.009 (0.046) -0.009 (0.028) 0.115 (0.101) 0.073 (0.034)
btdiarge 0.078 (0.082) 0.003 (0.051) 0.264 ( 1078) -0.033 (0.045)
ably dsman 0.093 (0.056) 0.098 (0.053) 0.237 (0.127) -0.042 (0.096)
abldniedium 0.214 (0.157) 0.210 (0.087) 0.124 (0.200) 0.190 (0.102)
abldtarge 0.766 (0.203) 0.303 (0.135) 1.228 (0.141) 0.084 (0.088)
Sargan 320.4 [ 264 ] 305.3 [ 264 1
W(d) 34.6 [ 11 1 154.9 [ 12 ] 38.4 [ 11 ] 145.2 [ 12 1
W(findustry) 55.8 [ 10 ] 76.2 [ 10]
mi. 21.3 [ 1282 ] 12.4 [ 1282 ] 20.8 [ 1282 ] 12.7 [ 1282]
n22 16.1 [ 1116 ] 6.4 [ 1116 ] 16.0 [ 1116 ] 6.3 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 6: MODEL WITH ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY TIME PERIODS
(2")	 f	 + atz f 72 ( //) 73 LB 2 1
v	 jtj	 M t t
_v_b 1 r 4 	75 (2-) 2 76 	)	 _ab { 77 (TgB	 t
K
+
 f + dt + ei,t+i
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
d77--83 1.022 (0.004) 1.019 (0.004) 1.024 (0.003) 1.024 (0.004)
1,g il
v (.84-87 1.026 (0.003) 1.021 (0.004) 1.023 (0.003) 1.021 (0.005)
11
 d88-90p 1.019 (0.005) 1.018 (0.004) 1.020 (0.005) 1.013 (0 .006)
ac/77_83 0.080 (0.012) 0.076 (0.013) 0.043 (0.019) 0.070 (0.022)
a
 d84-87 0.061 (0.014) 0.058 (0.014) -0.011 (0.034) 0.074 (0.032)
a i c/88_90 0.050 (0.021) 0.023 (0.018) 0.008 (0.034) 0.055 (0.061)
Note s:
0-477_83 -0.015 ( 1039) -0.038 (0.028) 0.175 (0.149) 0.042 (0.053)
14-44-87 0.038 (0.033) -0.007 (0 .026) 0.291 (0 .222) 0.048 (0.074)
blv-d88-90 0.000 (0 .040) -0.048 (0.032) 0.099 (0.191) 0.014 (0.091)
6:7- 47_83 0.091 (0.092) 0.145 (0.068) 0.446 (0.187) 0.333 (0.140)
abl-- (184-87 0.343 (0.084) 0.194 (0.063) 1.050 (0.306) 0.099 (0.155)
ab .P88-90 0.207 (0.079) 0.099 (0.061) 1.009 (0.275) 0.021 (0.180)
Sargan 92.4 [ 80 ] 92.2 [ 80]
W(d) 11.3 [ 11 ] 56.8 [ 12 ] 12.0 [ 11 ] 28.5 [ 12]
W( findustry) 54.0 { 10 1 55.7 [ 10 j
mi. 21.5 [ 1282 ] 12.4 [ 1282 ] 19.5 [ 1282 ] 13.2 [ 1282]
M2 16.9 [ 1116] 6.6 [ 1116 ] 14.7 [ 1116] 6.2 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
See table 1.
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Table 7: MODEL WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT COSTS
. a (As
 Bs ) +fi+dt+ei,t+ 1
{ 7, _ 	 ) , ap { r2 03) 	 01\1
1 IC	 -t- k 	 K
—	 t
Method
,
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
i.,
v 1.027 (0.002) 1.022 (0.004) 1.030 (0.001) 1.017 (0.004)
ct.v 0.049 (0.008) 0.020 (0.011) 0.071 (0 .008) 0.062 (0.018)
a 0.091 (0.010) 0.116 (0.014) 0.045 (0.010) 0.155 (0 .026)
Sargan 83.6 [ 69 ] 105.0 [ 69 ]
W(d) 45.5 E 11 ] 189.3 [ 12 ] 38.4 [ 11 ] 155.7 [ 12]
W(findustry ) 120.2 [ 10 ] 114.0 [ 10]
m1 22.6 E 1282 ] 14.2 [ 1282 ] 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.4 [ 1282]
M2 17.4 [ 1116 ] 8.3 [ 1116 ] 17.4 [ 1116 ] 8.4 [ 1116]
Instruments t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Observations 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 8: MODEL WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY FIRM SIZE
(x;Y) = /Iv 	) 1 + avil { 72 (13)	 (fl.)2} +a (As _ Bs \ fi dt
K t	 -11r)t	 Rr )t	 K	 ) t
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
dsmati 1.029 ( 1002) 1.028 (0.004) 1.032 (0.002) 1.031 (0.004)
1-:- dmedium 1.027 (0.003) 1.025 (0.005) 1.030 (0.002) 1.010 (0.003)
-,,dlarge 1.022 (0.005) 0.999 (0.007) 1.013 (0.003) 1.000 (0.004)
a i dsmau 0.050 (0.010) 0.025 (0.015) 0.059 (0.009) 0.100 (0.023)
a E dmedium 0.039 (0.012) 0.015 (0.015) 0.066 (0.011) 0.011 (0.022)
1 .va	 diarge 0.081 (0.025) 0.016 (0.030) 0.150 (0.018) -0.051 (0 .036)
a d sma ll 0.071 ( 1012) 0.097 (0.019) 0.033 (0.012) 0.139 (0.031)
admedium 0.130 (0.017) 0.132 (0.020) 0.068 (0.015) 0.174 (0.034)
adiarge 0.037 (0.033) 0.099 (0.037) -0.024 (0.022) 0.225 (0 .026)
Sargan 230.8 [ 207 ] 223.8 [ 207 ]
W(d) 44.9 [ 11 ] 186.1 [ 12 ] 39.3 [ 11 ] 162.5 [ 12 ]
W &industry 119.7 [ 10 ] 113.5 [ 10]
m 1 22.7 [ 1282 ] 14.0 [ 1282 ] 22.9 [ 1282 ] 14.5 [ 1282]
m2 17.3 [ 1116 ] 8.1 [ 1116 ] 17.3 [ 1116 ] 8.5 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 9: MODEL WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT COSTS
PARAMETERS ESTIMATED BY TIME PERIOD
2	 ASs _ Bs
  \
	(#) + H,;`- {7r2 GB')	 G) + a ( K )	 + + ei,t+i
	
t 	 t
Method OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DEVIATIONS
GMM
LEVELS
GMM
DEVIATIONS
ad77-83
di,	 84-87
d88-90
1.028
1.027
1.025
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.004)
1.023
1.022
1.019
(0.005)
( 1004)
(0.004)
1.031
1.030
1.027
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.004)
1.019
1.014
1.009
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.009)
a i c/77_83 0.053 (0.011) 0.036 (0.013) 0.072 (0.012) 0.059 (0.021)
ad84-87 0.052 (0.013) 0.007 (0.014) 0.067 (0.015) 0.008 (0.034)
a i -C/88-90 0.029 (0.018) -0.029 (0.017) 0.075 (0.020) 0.007 (0.061)
ad77-83 0.095 (0.014) 0.121 (0.018) 0.046 (0.014) 0.153 (0.031)
ad84-87 0.092 (0.017) 0.127 (0.017) 0.050 (0.017) 0.208 (0.044)
ad88-90 0.082 (0.020) 0.098 (0.020) 0.037 (0.021) 0.177 (0.077)
Sargan 82.7 E 63 ] 87.4 [ 63]
W(d) 8.2 [ 11 ] 43.6 [ 12 ] 10.6 [ 11 ] 36.1 [ 12 ]
W( f industry) 121.1 [ 10 ] 114.0 [ 10]
mi 22.6 [ 1282 ] 14.1 [ 1282 ] 22.6 [ 1282 ] 13.9 [ 1282]
m2 17.5 [ 1116 ] 8.4 [ 1116 ] 17.5 [ 1116 ] 8.5 [ 1116]
Instr. t-1,t-2 t-1,t-2
Obs. 8691 8691 8691 8691
Firms 1282 1282 1282 1282
Notes:
See table 1.
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Table 10: SUMMARY STATISTICS
VARIABLE SAMPLE OBS. MEAN MED. S.DEV. A.CORR. MIN
,
MAX
.1-7
i All 11255 0.057 0.032 0.091 0.320 -0.730 0.999
1977 - 1983 6260 0.060 0.033 0.095 0.323 -0.730 0.999
1984 - 1987 3165 0.058 0.034 0.091 0.315 -0.471 0.913
1988 - 1990 1830 0.044 0.026 0.076 0.316 -0.585 0.740
Small firms 5435 0.059 0.030 0.100 0.341 -0.532 0.999
Medium firms 4761 0.055 0.033 0.084 0.266 -0.730 0.913
Large firms 1059 0.052 0.034 0.070 0.441 -0.359 0.681
yB All 11255 0.212 0.167 0.184 0.790 0.000 1.466
1977 - 1983 6260 0.220 0.173 0.188 0.813 0.000 1.420
1984 - 1987 3165 0.203 0.159 0.181 0.779 0.000 1.466
1988 - 1990 1830 0.203 0.161 0.174 0.735 0.000 1.211
Small firms 5435 0.224 0.173 0.197 0.795 0.000 1.420
Medium firms 4761 0.203 0.163 0.174 0.783 0.000 1.466
Large firms 1059 0.192 0.158 0.150 0.767 0.000 1.364
As-Bs All 11255 0.103 0.073 0.212 0.788 -1.490 1.491if
1977 - 1983 6260 0.089 0.066 0.206 0.787 -1.490 1.491
1984 - 1987 3165 0.125 0.086 0.225 0.791 -0.956 1.422
1988 - 1990 1830 0.111 0.079 0.204 0.782 -1.056 1.147
Small firms 5435 0.098 0.068 0.219 0.793 -1.490 1.422
Medium firms 4761 0.102 0.074 0.206 0.774 -1.266 1.491
Large firms 1059 0.133 0.101 0.196 0.824 -1.056 1.377
Y-L All 11255 0.097 0.077 0.109 0.543 -0.503 0.697K
1977 - 1983 6260 0.102 0.081 0.114 0.495 -0.474 0.697
1984 - 1987 3165 0.096 0.077 0.107 0.617 -0.503 0.669
1988 - 1990 1830 0.078 0.066 0.097 0.572 -0.462 0.657
Small firms 5435 0.099 0.080 0.112 0.500 -0.463 0.681
Medium firms 4761 0.097 0.076 0.110 0.578 -0.503 0.697
Large firms 1059 0.087 0.071 0.093 0.623 -0.356 0.681
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Table 10: SUMMARY STATISTICS, continued
VARIABLE SAMPLE OBS. MEAN MED. S.DEV. A.CORR. MIN MAX
Y
"K All 11255 1.441 1.064 1.429 0.776 0.063 41.35
1977 - 1983 6260 1.466 1.107 1.501 0.744 0.063 41.35
1984 - 1987 3165 1.464 1.071 1.372 0.847 0.110 16.43
1988 - 1990 1830 1.319 0.931 1.258 0.766 0.141 23.43
Small firms 5435 1.474 1.098 1.421 0.782 0.063 31.28
Medium firms 4761 1.436 1.055 1.370 0.820 0.109 23.43
Large firms 1059 1.299 0.935 1.699 0.646 0.139 41.35
L
-K  All 11255 1.345 0.974 1.389 0.773 0.062 41.08
1977 - 1983 6260 1.364 1.004 1.462 0.740 0.062 41.08
1984 - 1987 3165 1.368 0.981 1.328 0.846 0.116 16.05
1988 - 1990 1830 1.241 0.876 1.226 0.763 0.113 23.25
Small firms 5435 1.375 0.999 1.380 0.781 0.062 30.67
Medium firms 4761 1.340 0.972 1.329 0.819 0.106 23.25
Large firms 1059 1.211 0.847 1.671 0.635 0.170 41.08
Table 11: OBSERVATIONS BY YEAR
YEAR FREQUENCY PERCENT CUM. PERCENT
Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete
1977 800 1118 7.11 8.14 7.11 8.14
1978 855 1089 7.60 7.93 14.70 16.08
1979 910 1062 8.09 7.74 22.79 23.81
1980 945 1042 8.40 7.59 31.19 31.40
1981 950 1052 8.44 7.66 39.63 39.07
1982 929 1025 8.25 7.47 47.88 46.53
1983 •	 871 964 7.74 7.02 55.62 53.55
1984 838 925 7.45 6.74 63.07 60.29
1985 791 902 7.03 6.57 70.09 66.86
1986 777 919 6.90 6.69 77.00 73.56
1987 759 924 6.74 6.73 83.74 80.29
1988 683 941 6.07 6.85 89.81 87.14
1989 613 886 5.45 6.45 95.26 93.60
1990 534 879 4.74 6.40 100.00 100.00
Total 11255 13728 100.00 100.00
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Table 12: OBSERVATIONS BY INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY (ISIC) FREQUENCY PERCENT CUM. PERCENT
Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete
Food (31) 2234 2689 19.85 19.59 19.85 19.59
Textiles (32) 890 1079 7.91 7.86 27.76 27.45
Wood (33) 1231 1484 10.94 10.81 38.69 38.26
Paper (34) 1648 1955 14.64 14.24 53.34 52.50
Chemicals (35) 826 933 7.34 6.80 60.68 59.29
Mineral Products (36) 471 515 4.18 3.75 64.86 63.05
Basic Metals (37) 347 399 3.08 2.91 67.94 65.95
Metal Products (381) 875 1117 7.77 8.14 75.72 74.09
Machinery (382) 959 1320 8.52 9.62 84.24 83.70
Electrical Products (383) 529 682 4.70 4.97 88.94 88.67
Transp.finstr. (384/5) 1245 1555 11.06 11.33 100.00 100.00
Total 11255 13728 100.00 100.00
Table 13: OBSERVATIONS PER FIRM
OBS. FREQUENCY PERCENT CUM. PERCENT
Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete Trimmed Complete
1 350 2.55 2.55
2 518 3.77 6.32
3 582 4.24 10.56
4 600 624 5.33 4.55 5.33 15.11
5 635 620 5.64 4.52 10.97 19.62
6 786 864 6.98 6.29 17.96 25.92
7 798 847 7.09 6.17 25.05 32.09
8 776 904 6.89 6.59 31.94 38.67
9 792 810 7.04 5.90 38.98 44.57
10 880 950 7.82 6.92 46.80 51.49
11 869 924 7.72 6.73 54.52 58.22
12 768 804 6.82 5.86 61.34 64.08
13 767 871 6.81 6.34 68.16 70.43
14 3584 4060 31.84 29.57 100.00 100.00
Total 11255 13728 100.00 100.00
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